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THE BEMBA APPEALS CHAMBER JUDGMENT: IMPUNITY
FOR SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES?
Susana SáCouto* and Patricia Viseur Sellers**
INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 2018, a majority of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) reversed the conviction of former military commander Jean-Pierre Bemba
for the crimes against humanity of rape and murder and the war crimes of rape,
murder, and pillaging committed by his troops in the Central African Republic (CAR)
between October 2002, and March 2003.1 The decision was clearly a disappointment
for the victims of the crimes committed by Bemba’s troops, who have been waiting
for more than fifteen years for a measure of justice. Significantly, the acquittal also
means that sixteen years after the Rome Statute came into force,2 and despite in-
creasing recognition of the prevalence of sexual violence in the situations under the
jurisdiction of the court, the ICC has yet to issue a single, final conviction for the
crime of sexual violence.
A number of commentators have critiqued various aspects of the judgment,
including the standard of review used by the Appeals Chamber.3 However, with few
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** Special Advisor for Gender to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Visiting
Fellow, Kellogg College, Oxford University; Senior Research Fellow, Human Rights Center,
University of California at Berkeley. The views expressed are personal to the author and are
not attributed to any institution.
1 See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08 A, Judgement on the Appeal of Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo Against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute” (June 8, 2018) [hereinafter Bemba Appeals Judgment]. This case concerned a military
campaign of atrocities, including sexual violence, murder, and pillaging, committed by the
Movement for Liberation of Congo (MLC), a rebel force operating in the armed conflict in
the Central African Republic (CAR) between 2002 and 2003. The Trial Chamber convicted
Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former vice-president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who
commanded the MLC, of war crimes and crimes against humanity, due to Bemba’s failure to
prevent or punish the criminal conduct of fighters under his effective control. See Prosecutor
v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, 183 (Mar. 21, 2016)
[hereinafter Bemba Trial Judgment]. Bemba appealed his conviction, arguing that he exercised
reasonable and necessary means to prevent and punish his troops for their acts. Ultimately,
the Appeals Chamber reversed Bemba’s conviction, thereby acquitting him of all charges.
See Bemba Appeals Judgment; see also infra Section II.B.
2 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute entered into force July 1, 2002.
3 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, In Bemba and Beyond, Crimes Adjudged to Commit
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exceptions,4 little of this commentary has focused on the impact of the Appeals Cham-
ber’s analysis of command responsibility under Article 28 of the Rome Statute on
sexual and gender-based crimes. This Article aims to fill that gap.
Article 28(a) requires three central elements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
in order to convict a military commander for the crimes of his or her subordinates,
namely that: (1) the commander had effective command and control, or effective au-
thority and control, over those subordinates; (2) he or she knew or should have known
that those forces were committing or about to commit crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC; and (3) he or she failed to take “all necessary and reasonable measures”
to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.5 The majority’s decision—in particular, its analysis
of the necessary and reasonable measures that a commander is required to take to
avoid liability under Article 28—evinces a problematic lack of gender competence.
Indeed, the majority’s approach in the Bemba appeal seems consistent with earlier
judgments6 in which the court similarly interpreted other modes of liability7 in the
absence of the kind of insight that a critical gender analysis would have offered.8 As
a forthcoming article we recently co-authored explains,9 the court has adopted a
rigid interpretation of direct and indirect co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a)10 and
Themselves, EJIL TALK! (June 13, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/in-bemba-and-beyond-crimes
-adjudged-to-commit-themselves [https://perma.cc/UW96-5EWD]; Leila N. Sadat, Fiddling
While Rome Burns? The Appeals Chamber’s Curious Decision in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, EJIL TALK! (June 12, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/fiddling-while-rome
-burns-the-appeals-chambers-curious-decision-in-prosecutor-v-jean-pierre-bemba-gombo
[https://perma.cc/25D6-QLUB]; Alex Whiting, Appeals Judges Turn the ICC on Its Head with
Bemba Decision, JUST SECURITY (June 14, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/57760/ap
peals-judges-turn-icc-head-bemba-decision [https://perma.cc/6NAH-7WP5].
4 See, e.g., Joseph Powderly & Niamh Hayes, The Bemba Appeal: A Fragmented Appeals
Chamber Destablises the Law and Practice of the ICC, PHD STUD. HUM. RTS. (June 26, 2018),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2018/06/the-bemba-appeal-fragmented-appeals
.html [https://perma.cc/RUL4-7P5Z]; Susana SáCouto, The Impact of the Appeals Chamber
Decision in Bemba: Impunity for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes?, INT’L JUST. MONITOR
(June 22, 2018), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/06/the-impact-of-the-appeals-chamber-deci
sion-in-bemba-impunity-for-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes [https://perma.cc/57JD-8H2N].
5 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(a).
6 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgement Pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2014) (acquitting the accused of the war crimes and crimes against
humanity of rape and sexual slavery despite the fact that these crimes were committed by the
same militia group against members of the same ethnic group in the same village and during
the same time as the other crimes of which the accused was convicted).
7 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25(3).
8 Susana SáCouto, Leila Nadya Sadat & Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Gendered Jurispru-
dence of the ad hoc Tribunals’ Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory of Liability and Article 25(3)
of the Rome Statute: Two Trains Running, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2019).
9 Id.
10 The court’s restrictive interpretation of indirect perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) “is
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applied common purpose liability under Article 25(3)(d) in an arguably discrimina-
tory manner,11thereby resulting in the acquittal of sexual violence charges against
the accused. Thus, combined with these earlier decisions, the majority’s analysis of
command responsibility in Bemba, if followed, significantly narrows the prospects
for successful prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes at the ICC.
This is hardly what drafters had in mind when adopting a statute which, for the
first time in history, not only enumerated a broad range of sexual violence and gender-
based (SVGB) crimes as war crimes and crimes against humanity,12 but also included
structural and procedural provisions13 intended to ensure that these crimes would be
likely to serve as a particularly high bar for cases involving sexual-violence charges.” SáCouto,
Sadat & Sellers, supra note 8. Indeed, it will likely be difficult to prove that individuals accused
of such crimes “unquestionably . . . conceived the crime, oversaw its preparation at different
hierarchical levels, and controlled its performance and execution” as required by the court’s
doctrinal construction of indirect interpretation, given that sexual violence, even when wide-
spread, often occurs because it is tolerated and permitted rather than explicitly ordered or
planned. SáCouto, Sadat & Sellers, supra note 8 (citing Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1412 (Mar. 1, 2014)).
11 SáCouto, Sadat & Sellers, supra note 8 (“It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Cham-
ber in Katanga isolated and treated SGBV crimes differently, both factually and legally, from the
other charged crimes. Rather than viewing the evidence in the record as linking the sexual
violence with the broader context in which it occurred, the Chamber analyzes these crimes sepa-
rately, requiring more concrete evidence than its own findings on common purpose liability
suggest it is legally required to show that the sexual violence was part of the common plan.”).
12 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1) (“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against
humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack . . . (g)
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”); see also id. art. 8(2)(b) (defining “war crimes”
as including “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts: . . . (xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy . . . enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”); id. art. 8(2)(e) (defining “war crimes” as including
“[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an in-
ternational character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of
the following acts . . . (vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy . . . enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a
serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions”); International Criminal
Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 6(b)(1) & n.3, Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) (noting that
although rape was not listed as a form of genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute, geno-
cide committed by acts causing “serious bodily or mental harm” may include “acts of torture,
rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment”). 
13 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 54(1)(b) (requiring that, in “ensur[ing] the effec-
tive investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court,” the prosecutor
“take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender
violence or violence against children”); ICC Rules of Procedure & Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3,
R.70(d) (Sept. 9, 2002) (“[C]redibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of
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adequately investigated and prosecuted by the court.14 Absent reconsideration, the
court’s jurisprudence on modes of liability will remain a major obstacle to the success-
ful prosecution of cases involving SVGB crimes, especially for high-ranking accused
who either did not clearly order the crimes or were not physically present during the
commission of those crimes.15
I. THE ROOTS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
The roots of command responsibility derive from the principle of responsible
command, which requires military commanders to ensure compliance by their sub-
ordinates with the laws and customs of war.16 The principle of responsible command
first appeared in the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
annexed to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention,17 and then in a number of post–World
a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or subsequent
conduct of a victim or witness”); id. R. 71 (“[A] Chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior
or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness.”).
14 Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 364–65, 375–83 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (noting that “[t]he experi-
ence of the [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] and [International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda], as well as the post–Second World War prosecutions under
control Council Law No. 10, suggested that [the effective investigation, prosecution, and trial
by the Court of sexual and gender violence crimes] would not necessarily flow automatically
from the inclusion of crimes of sexual and gender violence in the Statute. A number of dele-
gations at the [Preparatory Commission] and at the Diplomatic Conference therefore attached
importance to the inclusion of such special structural mechanisms”).
15 It is worth noting that a majority of the Bemba Appeals Chamber concluded that
Bemba could not be found liable for the crimes they found to have been established beyond
reasonable doubt—the vast majority of which were rapes—in part because he was a “remote”
commander. Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 191. The application of this reasoning
to a case involving predominantly crimes of sexual violence is disturbingly similar to a ten-
dency in the early jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR) in which judges tended to impose higher evidentiary thresholds in cases
involving sexual and gender-based crimes compared to other types of cases. See Susana
SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Importance of Effective Investigation of Sexual Violence
and Gender-Based Crimes at the International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC.
POL’Y & L. 337, 356 (2009) (concluding upon a review of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tri-
bunals on various modes of liability, including command responsibility, that in cases of sexual
violence, the tribunals appeared “reluctant to draw meaningful inferences from circumstantial
evidence and . . . to prefer direct or more specific evidence as to knowledge or causality,
even when such evidence [was] not required as a matter of law”).
16 See Jamie Allan Williamson, Some Considerations on Command Responsibility and
Criminal Liability, INT’L REV. RED CROSS 303, 303–05, 317 (June 30, 2008), https://www.
icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-870_williamson.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM52-X3EK].
17 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 1, reprinted
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 71 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiøí Toman eds., 1988).
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War I international conventions, including the Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field,18 and the Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.19
In the post–World War II trials, commanders were held criminally liable for failure
to exercise control over subordinates and to repress or redress their crimes. In the case
against Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita, for instance, a U.S. Military Commis-
sion in the Philippines found Yamashita guilty and sentenced him to death, stating:
Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by
broad authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true in all
armies throughout recorded history. It is absurd, however, to con-
sider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers
commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape
and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there
is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control
the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible,
even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, depend-
ing upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them.20
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, also referred to as The
Tokyo Tribunal) also imposed criminal liability based upon command responsibility.21
Regarding the infamous military operation known as the “Rape of Nanking,” for
18 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, June 19, 1931, 118 L.N.T.S. 303, 327, Art. 26.
19 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, June 19, 1931, 118 L.N.T.S.
343, 363, Art. 18.
20 United States v. Yamashita, Case No. 21, a Military Commission appointed by ¶ 24,
Special Orders 100, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Western Pacific (Feb. 4, 1946),
reprinted in IV LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 35 (1948).
21 The Tokyo Tribunal judges opined that “Army or Navy commanders can, by order,
secure proper treatment and prevent ill treatment of prisoners. . . . If crimes are committed
against prisoners under their control, of the likely occurrence of which they had, or should have
had knowledge in advance, they are responsible for those crimes.” International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East, Judgment, at 48446, reprinted in 103 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES
TRIAL (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998). See also Maj. W.H. Parks, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1–11, 66 (1993). For further discussion of the IMTFE sexual-
violence jurisprudence, see KELLY D. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997); Kelly D. Askin, Treatment of Sexual
Violence in Armed Conflict: A Historical Perspective and the Way Forward, in SEXUAL VIO-
LENCE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES (Anne Marie de
Brouwer et al. eds., 2013); Patricia Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence: Sexual Violence
as Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 287–93 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak
Goldman eds., 2000).
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instance, the Tokyo Tribunal judges found the commander, General Iwane Matsui,
guilty, noting:
In this period of six or seven weeks, thousands of women were
raped. . . . The Tribunal is satisfied that Matsui knew what was
happening. He did nothing or nothing effective to abate these
horrors. . . . He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his
troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must
be held criminally liable for his failure to discharge his duty.22
Notably, the Tokyo Tribunal extended the principle to civilian superiors. Among the
civilian leaders convicted by the IMTFE under superior responsibility—inclusive
of crimes of sexual violence—was Koki Hirota, who served as both Foreign Minister
and Prime Minister of Japan between 1933 and 1938.23 In finding that Hirota had dis-
regarded his legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent
breaches of the laws of war, the IMTFE explained:
As Foreign Minister, he received reports of . . . atrocities immedi-
ately after the entry of the Japanese forces into Nanking. [A]ccord-
ing to the Defence, . . . credence was given to these reports and
the matter was taken up with the War Ministry. Assurances were
accepted from the War Ministry that the atrocities would be
stopped. After these assurances had been given reports of atroci-
ties continued to come in for at least a month. The Tribunal is of
[the] opinion that [Hirota] was derelict in his duty in not insisting
before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken to put an end
to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring
about the same result. He was content to rely on assurances which
he knew were not being implemented while hundreds of murders,
violations of women, and other atrocities were being committed
daily. His inaction amounted to criminal negligence.24
A number of superiors, both civilian and military, were also tried pursuant to
Control Council Law No. 10.25 In these cases, superiors were individually found
criminally responsible based on their failures both to prevent and to punish the crimes
22 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Iwane Matsui Judgment, at 49815–16,
reprinted in 103 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 49791.
25 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMI-
NALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
10 XVI (1951).
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committed by their subordinates.26 For instance, in the Hostage Case,27 high-ranking
German officers were charged with criminal responsibility under the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility for the murder, deportation, and looting of thousands of civilians
from Nazi-occupied Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Albania between September
1939, and May 1945, by troops under their command and acting pursuant to their
orders.28 One of the defendants, General Wilhelm List, was charged with passing to
subordinates illegal orders that resulted in ruthless measures against the civilian
population of the Balkans.29 Upon review of the facts, the tribunal held List’s failure
to terminate the unlawful killings in his zone of command and to take adequate steps
to prevent their recurrence constituted a serious breach of duty, rendering him
criminally responsible.30
The concept of superior responsibility was codified in Additional Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.31 According to Article 86(2), superiors are not
26 See, e.g., United States v. Von Leeb, Case No. 12, Judgment (Oct. 27–28, 1948), reprinted
in 10–11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 512, 558 (1951) (finding Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, command-
ing General of the German Army Group North, guilty of implementing the Barbarossa Juris-
diction Order despite suspecting the order’s illegality, and noting that “[a]ny participation
in implementing such orders, tacit or otherwise, any silent acquiescence in their enforcement
by his subordinates, constitutes a criminal act on his part”);  United States v. Flick, Case No. 5,
Judgment (Dec. 22, 1947) reprinted in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1187, 1202 (1952) (finding Flick
and Weiss, two leading civilian industrialists, guilty for their participation in the use of slave
labor, and in particular finding that Flick was criminally responsible for his “knowledge and
approval” of the steps taken by Weiss to procure slave laborers); United States v. Brandt (The
Medical Case), Case No. 1, Judgment (Aug. 17, 1947), reprinted in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMI-
NALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10
171, 207 (1951) (reaffirming the principle that “[t]he law of war imposes on a military officer in
a position of command an affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power and appro-
priate to the circumstances to control those under his command for the prevention of acts
which are violations of the law of war”); Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of
the Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany v. Roechlin, Indict-
ment and Judgment of the General Tribunal of the Military Government of the French Zone of
Occupation in Germany, reprinted in 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1061, 1088 (1951) (convicting
the civilian superior Herman Roechling, head of Roechling Iron and Steel Works in Voelklingen,
for the mistreatment of forced laborers, and noting that the basis of Roechling’s liability did not
stem from having ordered the horrific treatment, but from “having tolerated it and [from] not
having done anything in order to have [the treatment] modified”).
27 United States v. List, Case No. 7 (Feb. 19, 1948), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMI-
NALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
10 759 (William S. Hein & Co. 1950).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1263–64.
30 Id. at 1274.
31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
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absolved of responsibility for breaches by their subordinates if the superiors knew, or
had information enabling them to conclude, that the breaches were being committed
or were about to be committed, and they did not take reasonable measures to prevent
them.32 Article 87 adds a requirement that superiors report breaches by their subordi-
nates to competent authorities and take disciplinary or penal action against violators.33
Additionally Protocol II does not directly express the requirements of command
responsibility within the context of non-international armed conflict.34 Nonetheless,
the ICTY appeals decision in the Hadžihasanoviæ35 case made clear that organized
military forces operate on the basis of responsible command, irrespective of the
characterization of the conflict.36 Specifically, the decision held that the command
responsibility doctrine applied under international customary law to internal armed
conflict, notwithstanding the absence of reference to the doctrine in Additional
Protocol II.37 Accordingly, command responsibility had been interpreted to cover
armed conflicts governed by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and by
Additional Protocol II, having a basis in customary international law that dates from,
at least, the early 1990s.
II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 28 OF THE ROME STATUTE
Under Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, “a military commander or person
effectively acting as a military commander” may be held criminally responsible for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and control, where:
1. That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circum-
stances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes; and
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (1979).
32 Id. art. 86(2).
33 Id. art. 87.
34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (1979).
35 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanoviæ, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, ¶ 14 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003).
36 Id. ¶ 16.
37 Id. ¶¶ 28–31. The Hadžihasanoviæ case concerned events occurring in the former
Yugoslavia between January 1993 and March 1994. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanoviæ, Case No.
IT-01-47-PT, Third Amended Indictment, ¶ 7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia
Sept. 26, 2003).
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2. That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.38
A. The Trial Chamber’s Approach
Bemba was the first verdict in which the Trial Chamber had an opportunity to lay
out its interpretation of the elements of command responsibility.39 While the court ad-
dressed all of these elements, our discussion here is focused on the two elements rele-
vant to our analysis of the Appeals Chamber decision—namely effective control and
failure to take all reasonable and necessary measures to prevent or repress the crimes.40
In its judgment, the Trial Chamber explained that “effective control” requires
that the commander have the material ability to prevent or repress the commission of
the crimes or to submit the matter to the competent authorities, and that any lower de-
gree of control, such as the ability to exercise influence—even substantial influence—
over the forces who committed the crimes, would be insufficient to establish command
responsibility.41 Furthermore, whether or not there are intermediary subordinates
between the commander and the forces which committed the crimes is immaterial;
the question is simply whether or not the commander had effective control over the
relevant forces.42 There is no requirement that a commander have sole or exclusive
authority and control over the forces who committed the crimes; it is possible for
multiple individuals to have effective authority and control.43
With respect to “all reasonable and necessary measures,” the Trial Chamber made
clear that Article 28(a)(ii) imposes three distinct duties upon commanders: “(i) pre-
venting the commission of crimes; (ii) repressing the commission of crimes; and (iii)
submitting the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”44
Failure to discharge any of these responsibilities may entail liability.45 The scope of
the duty to prevent depends on the material power of the commander to intervene in
a specific situation, which in turn “is dependent on the circumstances at the relevant
time.”46 These measures can include “issuing orders specifically meant to prevent the
crimes, as opposed to merely issuing routine orders;” “suspending, excluding, or re-
deploying violent subordinates;” and “taking disciplinary measures to prevent the
38 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(a).
39 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 183.
40 Id.
41 Id. ¶¶ 170, 183.
42 Id. ¶ 184.
43 Id. ¶ 185.
44 Id. ¶ 201.
45 Id.
46 Id. ¶ 203.
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commission of atrocities by the forces under the commander’s command.”47 The
duty to repress, while related to the duty to prevent, is intended “to ensure that mili-
tary commanders fulfil their obligation to search for the perpetrators and either bring
them before the courts or hand them over to another state for trial.”48 Further, “[i]f
the commander has no power to sanction those who committed the crimes, he has
an obligation to submit the matter to the competent authorities.”49 The duty to punish
or to submit the matter to competent authorities “aims at ensuring that offenders are
brought to justice, in order to avoid impunity and to prevent future crimes.”50 At a
minimum, the duty to punish includes “the obligation to investigate possible crimes
in order to establish the facts.”51 Significantly:
[A] commander cannot be considered to have discharged his duty
to submit the matter if he does not submit the matter to an au-
thority competent to investigate and prosecute the alleged perpetra-
tor. Further, referral to a non-functioning authority or an authority
likely to conduct an inadequate investigation or prosecution may
not be sufficient to fulfil the commander’s obligations.52
The Trial Chamber spent nearly four years hearing the case,53 taking testimony
from seventy-seven witnesses, including seven expert witnesses, and reviewing 733
items of documentary evidence.54 In a unanimous decision, the Trial Chamber con-
cluded that Bemba had effective control over the Movement for the Liberation of
the Congo (MLC) forces operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) based not
only on his role as President of the MLC and Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces,
which gave him “broad formal powers, ultimate decision-making authority, and powers
of appointment, promotion, and dismissal,”55 but also based on evidence that he
“controlled the MLC’s funding, had direct lines of communication to commanders
in the field, had well-established reporting systems, received operational and technical
advice from the MLC General Staff, and both could, and did, issue operational
orders.”56 In determining that Bemba had effective control over the MLC forces in the
CAR, the Trial Chamber also took into account the fact that Bemba had represented
47 Id. ¶¶ 203–04. See also Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant
to Art. 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco
Ntaganda, ¶ 172 (June 9, 2014).
48 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 206.
49 Id. ¶¶ 207–08.
50 Id. ¶ 209.
51 Id. ¶ 207.
52 Id. ¶ 208.
53 Id. ¶¶ 10–16.
54 Id. ¶ 221.
55 Id. ¶ 697.
56 Id.
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the MLC forces in external matters, such as responding to the media or in discus-
sions with the UN,57 had disciplinary powers over MLC members, “including the
power to initiate inquiries and establish courts-martial,” and had the ability to send
or withdraw troops from the CAR.58
After hearing all the evidence, the Trial Chamber concluded that although the
accused took some measures to address alleged crimes committed by his forces in
the CAR, including creating two commissions to investigate those crimes and con-
ducting a trial of some soldiers,59 those measures were insufficient, meaning the
accused had failed in his duties to prevent, repress, and punish the crimes.60 In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted, inter alia, that:
• Although Bemba set up a commission—known as the Mondonga
Inquiry—in response to allegations that crimes were being committed
in the CAR by MLC soldiers, investigators did not pursue various relevant
leads—in particular, reports of rape and the responsibility of com-
manders—and no explanation or justification was given for those omis-
sions. As a result, only seven low-ranking soldiers were tried, and solely
on charges of pillaging minor goods and “small sums of money.”61
• Although Bemba established a second commission of inquiry—known
as the Zongo Commission—in response to “public allegations of murder,
rape, and pillaging by MLC soldiers”—the mandate of that Commission
was limited to addressing allegations of pillaging. Moreover, “[i]t was . . .
comprised solely of MLC officials, and based its . . . interviews on eight
Zongo inhabitants who . . . worked for the MLC” rather than soldiers.62
• During a visit to the CAR, Bemba did not take “any concrete measures
in response to allegations of crimes by MLC soldiers.”63
• Finally, there was “no evidence that [ ] Bemba followed up on or en-
forced general warnings he publicly made to his troops against abuse
of the civilian population.”64
57 Id. ¶ 702.
58 Id. ¶ 697.
59 Id. ¶ 719. In particular, the measures included:
[T]he Mondonga Inquiry; a November 2002 visit to the CAR, during
which Mr Bemba met with the UN representative in the CAR, General
Cissé, and President Patassé; a speech given at PK12 in November 2002;
the trial of Lieutenant Willy Bomengo and others at the Gbadolite court-
martial; the Zongo Commission; correspondence with General Cissé;
correspondence in response to the FIDH Report; and the Sibut Mission.
Id.
60 Id. ¶ 727.
61 Id. ¶¶ 589, 720.
62 Id. ¶ 722.
63 Id. ¶ 721.
64 Id. The Trial Chamber went on to note that:
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After considering all the evidence, the Trial Chamber ultimately determined that the
measures Bemba took were “a grossly inadequate response to the consistent infor-
mation of widespread crimes committed by MLC soldiers in the CAR.”65
B. The Appeals Chamber Approach
On review of the Trial Chamber’s judgment, a majority of the Appeals Chamber
decided that rather than adopt the standard of review for factual errors used by the
Appeals Chamber in an earlier case66—and consistently used by the ICTY and
ICTR67—it would use a new standard. Instead of determining “whether a reasonable
trial chamber could have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the finding in
question,”68 which would mean giving the Trial Chamber a “margin of deference” with
respect to its evaluation of the evidence,69 the Appeals Chamber in Bemba decided it
In addition to or instead of the insufficient measures Mr Bemba did take,
and in light of his extensive material ability to prevent and repress the
crimes, Mr Bemba could have, inter alia, (i) ensured that the MLC troops
in the CAR were properly trained in the rules of international humanitarian
law, and adequately supervised during the 2002–2003 CAR Operation;
(ii) initiated genuine and full investigations into the commission of crimes,
and properly tried and punished any soldiers alleged of having committed
crimes; (iii) issued further and clear orders to the commanders of the
troops in the CAR to prevent the commission of crimes; (iv) altered the
deployment of the troops, for example, to minimise contact with civilian
populations; (v) removed, replaced, or dismissed officers and soldiers
found to have committed or condoned any crimes in the CAR; and/or
(vi) shared relevant information with the CAR authorities or others and
supported them in any efforts to investigate criminal allegations.
Id. ¶ 729.
65 Id. ¶ 727.
66 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, ¶ 21 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Lubanga
Appeals Judgment].
67 Prosecutor v. Blagojeviæ, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,
Appeals Judgement, ¶ 63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000).
68 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 38.
69 Lubanga Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 24 (explaining that deference is given
to the Trial Chamber on matters of fact because “[t]he Trial Chamber has the advantage of
observing witnesses in person and so is better positioned than the Appeals Chamber to assess
the reliability and credibility of the evidence. Accordingly, it is primarily for the Trial
Chamber to determine whether a witness is credible and to decide which witness’[s]
testimony to prefer, without necessarily articulating every step of the reasoning in reaching
a decision on these points. This discretion is, however, tempered by the Trial Chamber’s duty
to provide a reasoned opinion” (quoting Prosecutor v. Kupreškiæ, Case No. IT-95-16-A,
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could “interfere with the factual findings of the first-instance chamber whenever the
failure to interfere may occasion a miscarriage of justice,”70 and that it would do so
when it is “able to identify findings that can reasonably be called into doubt.”71 At the
same time, a majority of the Appeals Chamber declined to “assess the evidence de
novo,”72 meaning that even though it granted less deference to the Trial Chamber’s as-
sessment of the evidence, it did not assess anew all the evidence in the record. Relying,
therefore, on its own limited review of the evidence, a majority of the Appeals Chamber
disagreed with the Trial Chamber’s analysis of the evidence, acquitting Bemba of
all charges.73 It first found that the Trial Chamber had erred in convicting Bemba for
various criminal acts—including several acts of rape, murder, and pillaging74—
because these acts did not fall within the “facts and circumstances described in the
charges.”75 It then found that the Trial Chamber had erred in convicting Bemba for
those acts which were adequately described in the charges and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt because the Trial Chamber made a number of errors that “resulted
in an unreasonable assessment of whether [ ] Bemba failed to take all [the] necessary
and reasonable measures” required to avoid liability under Article 28 of the Rome
Statute.76 Ironically, perhaps, although the vast majority of the acts adequately
described in the charges and proven beyond a reasonable doubt were acts of sexual
violence,77 little of the majority’s discussion is dedicated to whether any of the mea-
sures Bemba took were intended to address sexual violence allegations.78 Indeed, as
discussed below, the majority’s reasoning reveals a problematic tendency—discernible
in earlier cases as well79—to assess questions of liability through an arguably gendered
lens, increasing the risk of impunity for SGBV crimes.
Appeals Judgement, ¶ 32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001) (altera-
tion in original))).
70 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 40 (emphasis added).
71 Id. ¶ 46.
72 Id. ¶ 42 (citing Lubanga Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 27). Lubanga clarified that:
[A]n appeal is not a trial de novo. In making its assessment, the Appeals
Chamber will in principle only take into account the following factual
evidence: evidence referred to by the Trial Chamber in the body of the
judgement or in a related footnote; evidence contained in the trial record
and referred to by the parties; and additional evidence admitted on appeal.
Lubanga Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶¶ 26–27 (citations omitted). It is worth noting,
however, that unlike in Bemba, the Lubanga Chamber applied the more deferential standard
of review, thus obviating a need for it to conduct a de novo review.
73 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 196–98.
74 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 742.
75 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 196 (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 2,
art. 74(2)).
76 Id. ¶ 193.
77 Id. ¶ 119.
78 See id.
79 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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1. The Trial Chamber’s Failure to Assess the Measures Bemba Should Have
Taken by Reference to the Specific Crimes That Were Actually Committed
Among the errors identified by the majority was the Trial Chamber’s failure to
assess the measures Bemba should have taken by reference to the specific crimes
that were actually committed.80 The majority found that because the number of
crimes adequately described in the charges and proven at trial beyond a reasonable
doubt were “comparatively low,” it was hard to assess how widespread the criminal
acts were, making it “difficult to assess the proportionality of the measures taken.”81
It suggested that if the Trial Chamber had confined its assessment of the measures
Bemba took by comparing those measures to the limited number of crimes for which
he was convicted—rather than the “much broader and more general ‘finding’ by the
Trial Chamber concerning widespread MLC criminality in the CAR”—it might have
found those measures sufficient.82
There are several problems with this analysis. The first relates to the majority’s
position on the crime base against which the measures Bemba took should be
assessed. Although the majority did not find Bemba guilty for the crimes that were
not, in their view, adequately described in the charges, this finding does not mean
those crimes did not occur, or that they should have been taken into consideration
when assessing the sufficiency of the measures Bemba took to prevent or repress
crimes about which he knew or should have known. As the dissenting judges point
out, those “individual criminal acts were presented by the Prosecutor as examples
of the criminality alleged to have been committed by the MLC troops during the
2002–2003 CAR Operation.”83 Thus, “the adequacy of the measures taken by [] Bemba
to prevent and repress the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
must be assessed in light of the scale and duration of the criminal activity alleged
as a whole.”84
This relates to a second issue, namely the majority’s critique of the Trial Chamber’s
reliance on “reliable evidence” that MLC crimes committed in the CAR were
widespread. The majority notes that “the evidence in question, on its face, appears
for the most part very weak, often consisting of media reports including anonymous
hearsay[,]” adding that “the Trial Chamber failed to . . . address its potentially
extremely low probative value.”85 However, the majority failed to mention that
among the evidence relied on by the Trial Chamber was the testimony of various
80 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 183.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Monageng and
Hofmañski, ¶ 94 (June 8, 2018) [hereinafter Bemba Appeals Dissenting Opinion] (emphasis
added).
84 Id.
85 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 183.
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witnesses,86 which in turn was corroborated by media articles, NGO reports, and oral
recordings of victims’ statements submitted to the Bangui Court of Appeals.87 More-
over, the majority did not have an opportunity, as did the Trial Chamber, to hear that
testimony first hand, or to evaluate its reliability and credibility in light of all the
other evidence submitted to the Court, given that it did not conduct a de novo review
of the entire trial. Indeed, given these limitations, it is difficult to see why the ma-
jority felt better suited to assess the reliability and credibility of this evidence than
the Trial Chamber.
Third, the majority recognized that “[t]he scope of the duty to take ‘all necessary
and reasonable measures’ is intrinsically connected to the extent of a commander’s
material ability to prevent or repress the commission of crimes or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”88 The mate-
rial ability of a commander to take measures, in turn, is “directly connected to his
or her level of authority . . . and what he or she might reasonably have been ex-
pected to do.”89 As discussed above, the Trial Chamber found that Bemba had
“disciplinary powers over MLC members, including the power to initiate inquiries
and establish courts-martial.”90 Thus, one way to assess whether the measures
Bemba took were sufficient would be to evaluate the Trial Chamber’s findings on
whether Bemba adequately exercised this authority. In other words, the more authority
Bemba had over MLC troops in the CAR, the more he could have been expected to
prevent or repress crimes committed by those troops and vice versa. However, the
majority did not address this.91 Rather, it turned to an assessment of “all necessary
and reasonable measures” and introduced—without citing to any authority—a novel
interpretation of that phrase.92 Indeed, despite the plain language of Article 28,
which states that a commander is liable if he or she fails to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the crimes or to
submit them to the competent authorities, the majority states:
86 See, e.g., Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 461 (citing witness P6); id. ¶ 486
(citing witnesses P73, P42, P119, P38, P112, P178, P69, and P23); id. ¶ 520 (citing witnesses
P119 and P69); id. ¶ 525 (citing witnesses P209, P63, P6, P178, and P9); id. ¶ 527 (citing
witnesses P173, P6, and P9); id. ¶ 531 (citing witnesses P69, P173, P38, P119, and victim par-
ticipant V2); id. ¶ 534 (citing witnesses P178, P169, P173, P6, and P9).
87 Id. ¶¶ 461, 486, 520, 525, 527, 531, 534.
88 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 167 (emphasis added).
89 Id. ¶ 169.
90 Id.
91 In fact, although the Appeals Chamber expressed “concerns regarding the Trial Chamber’s
findings relevant to Mr Bemba’s effective control”—which included an assessment of Bemba’s
level and exercise of authority over his troops, Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 697—
it did not address these in any detail, having chosen to focus instead on the Trial Chamber’s
errors regarding its analysis of “Mr Bemba’s purported failure to take all necessary and rea-
sonable measures.” Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 32.
92 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 32.
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[I]t is not the case that a commander must take each and every
possible measure at his or her disposal. Despite the link between
the material ability of a commander to take measures (which is
directly connected to his or her level of authority) and what he
or she might reasonably have been expected to do, it is not the case
that a commander is required to employ every single conceivable
measure within his or her arsenal, irrespective of considerations
of proportionality and feasibility.93
Thus, rather than grapple with Bemba’s level of authority and whether the mea-
sures he took were consistent with an adequate exercise of that authority, the majority
introduces a new standard by which the reasonableness of his measures are to be
assessed: proportionality.94 The focus, therefore, turns to numbers, which leads to
the fourth and perhaps most significant problem with the majority’s analysis, namely
the gendered means by which it analyzes reasonableness.
As noted earlier, the majority held that the scope of the duty to take measures
to prevent or repress crimes depends on the scale and duration of the crimes that
were committed.95 However, these are not the only factors the majority found
relevant to evaluating the adequacy of Bemba’s measures. Earlier in the judgment,
the majority found that only one murder, twenty acts of rape, and five acts of pil-
laging had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.96 Its opinion suggests that
the specific character of these crimes also factors into the examination of whether
a commander adequately executed his responsibilities. Indeed, in its critique of the
Trial Chamber, the majority noted that “the Trial Chamber did not link Mr Bemba’s
putative failure to take adequate measures to any of the specific criminal acts . . .
which he was ultimately convicted of.”97 Thus, it appears that its corrective approach
would have considered not only scale and duration, but also the specific type of
criminal conduct of which the accused was convicted. As the majority emphasized:
93 Id. ¶ 169. The majority went on to add—again, without citing any authority—that:
In assessing reasonableness, the Court is required to consider other pa-
rameters, such as the operational realities on the ground at the time faced
by the commander. . . . Commanders are allowed to make a cost/benefit
analysis when deciding which measures to take, . . . This means that a
commander may take into consideration the impact of measures to pre-
vent or repress criminal behaviour on ongoing or planned operations and
may choose the least disruptive measure as long as it can reasonably be
expected that this measure will prevent or repress the crimes.
Id. ¶ 170.
94 See id.
95 Id. ¶ 183.
96 Id. ¶ 119.
97 Id. ¶ 136 (emphasis added).
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[A] finding that the measures deployed by a commander were
insufficient to prevent or repress an extended crime wave, for
example five hundred crimes, does not mean that these measures
were also insufficient to prevent or repress the limited number
of specific crimes, for example 20 crimes, for which the com-
mander is ultimately convicted.98
Addressing the particularly high incidence of rape—as compared to other types
of crimes of which Bemba was convicted—would appear to be a significant indica-
tor that Bemba had fulfilled his duties. Conversely, failure to address the specific
nature of these crimes would appear to indicate a dereliction of his responsibilities
as a commander.
Therefore, notwithstanding the judges’ varying views about the scope of the ap-
propriate criminal conduct against which Bemba’s measures should be assessed,
even using the majority’s calculation of crimes as a base line, it seems clear that
what had to be punished, repressed, prevented or reported up the chain of command
were overwhelmingly acts of sexual assault. Indeed, the conservative or limited
number of crimes does not modify, but rather amplifies, the characterization of the
criminal conduct as predominantly sexual in nature. Therefore, what should have
been scrutinized when determining how to rule upon Article 28’s “necessary and
reasonable measures” requirement is the capacity of those measures to address that
particular crime base.
Ultimately, however, the majority said nothing about the sufficiency of Bemba’s
efforts with respect to the particular nature of the crimes of which he was convicted.
Despite the distinct standard it appears to have fashioned, the Appeals Chamber
majority did not evaluate the adequacy of Bemba’s measures in light of the 20:1 ratio
of rapes to murders or the 4:1 ratio of rapes to acts of pillaging. Indeed, the majority’s
detailed identification of the crimes finds no corollary in its evaluation of Bemba’s ac-
tions. To the contrary, although two of the chief mechanisms set up to investigate alle-
gations of crimes committed by Bemba’s troops in the CAR either failed to adequately
pursue reports of rape (the Mondonga Inquiry)99 or were limited to allegations of pil-
laging (Zongo Commission),100 the majority made no observations about the quality—
or lack thereof—of these investigations with respect to sexual-violence allegations.101
The manner in which the majority handled Bemba’s claims about the Mondonga
Inquiry illustrates this point. In relation to the scope of the Mondonga Inquiry, Bemba
challenged as “‘inaccurate and unreasonable’ the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that
the Mondonga Inquiry was limited to allegations of pillaging, contending that the
Trial Chamber ignored directly relevant evidence from D19 who testified that Colonel
98 Id. ¶ 193 (emphasis added).
99 Id. ¶¶ 589, 720.
100 Id. ¶ 722.
101 Id. ¶¶ 589, 720, 722.
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Moustapha was questioned as to rape and killing during the course of the inquiry.”102
The transcript of the trial proceedings reveals that the question posed to the Colonel
about rape was whether he had “seen” any rapes.103 In other words, the Colonel was
asked whether he had been a direct eyewitness to rape, to which he responded in the
negative.104 There is no indication that Colonel Moustapha was asked about whether he
had read or heard about a report by the Federation International de Droits d’Hommes
(FIDH) alleging that Bemba’s troops had committed rapes or whether he knew of
or could have become aware of the rapes through inquiry notice,105 particularly the
specific rapes committed in late 2002 that the majority found had been committed.106
Significantly, although the majority questioned the credibility of the evidence
relied upon by the Trial Chamber of widespread criminality by MLC troops,107 it did
not question the evidence demonstrating that Bemba had been alerted to the FIDH
report.108 In other words, Bemba had knowledge of the allegation of rapes. In fact,
though he reacted to the rape accusations against members of the MLC as a defama-
tory political attack,109 he communicated with the President of FIDH110 and initiated
the Mondongo inquiry.111 Thus, his knowledge of the types of crimes allegedly
committed by troops was undeniable even if he personally disputed the contents of
the FIDH report, meaning he remained under an obligation to act on them.112 Given
that his knowledge of the potential for rapes or the possibility that they already
occurred was an uncontested fact, it stands to reason that the design of the means
102  Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 161 (citing Bemba’s Appeals Brief, which
in turn referred to the Trial Chamber Transcript of 26 February 2013, ICC-01/05-01/08-T
-285-Red2-Eng, p. 42, lines 6–11).
103 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Trial Chamber Transcript of 26 February 2013, ICC-01/05-01/08-T
-285-Red2-Eng, p. 42, lines 6–11.
104  Id.
105 See Prosecutor v. Celebici, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, ¶ 241
(Feb. 20, 2001) (affirming command responsibility “had reason to known” standard as includ-
ing “inquiry notice,” meaning the duty to inquire further when put on notice that crimes were
committed by subordinates).
106 Id. ¶ 116 (“The rape of two unidentified girls aged 12 and 13 years in Bangui on or around
30 October 2002”; “The rape of a woman in the bush outside of PK22 in November 2002”; and
“The rape of P69 and his wife in PK12 at the end of November 2002.”). Although the majority
found these rapes had not been adequately described in the charges against the accused and
that the Trial Chamber had erred in convicting Bemba of these criminal acts, it made clear that
it did not dispute the rapes had been committed, finding that they “could [for instance] be taken
into account for the finding regarding the contextual element of crimes against humanity.”
Id. ¶ 117.
107  Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 183.
108 Id.
109 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 574, 577 n.1780, 578 (citing witness P-15).
110 Id. ¶¶ 600, 610–11.
111 Id. ¶ 178.
112 See Celebici, Appeals Chamber Judgement, ¶ 241 (Feb. 20, 2001) (affirming commanders
have a duty to inquire further when put on notice that crimes were committed by subordinates).
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and types of measures Bemba selected should have taken into account these particu-
lar types of crimes.
Simply put, facts concerning sexual violence were insufficiently elicited in the
Mondongo inquiry and Bemba’s establishment of that inquiry should have been re-
garded as insufficient in light of his knowledge that the alleged crimes committed
by his troops included rapes. Yet, the majority did not interrogate these deficiencies.
Indeed, the incompetent manner of taking rape evidence was not only not questioned
by Bemba, but also readily accepted by the majority, which found the inquiry evidence
of the reasonableness of his efforts.113
The majority took a similar approach to the subsequent investigation in Zongo,
which concerned only allegations of pillaging.114 The limited mandate raised no
doubts for Bemba or for the majority, which accepted the outcome of the investigation
as evidence of a reasonable measure. Likewise, the Appeals Chamber majority failed
to scrutinize why the court-martial that resulted from the Bomengo case investiga-
tion,115 which contained detailed information about acts of pillaging and rape
allegedly committed by his troops in the CAR,116 was limited to pillaging charges.117
There was no indication that Bemba ordered any commanders subordinate to him
to speak to survivors or civilian witnesses on the ground such as humanitarian workers,
or to interview MLC foot soldiers or their immediate superiors concerning whether
they took any action to address SVGB crimes.118 Indeed, there was no indication that
Bemba questioned the limitations of the investigation commissions or the court-
martial or did anything further to ensure that allegations of sexual violence would
be investigated.119 Despite these inadequacies, the majority made no effort to assess
the competence or quality of the measures Bemba took with respect to preventing
or repressing sexual violence.120 It never questioned, for instance, the absence of
physical, digital, or other forensic evidence of sexual violence. Significantly, the
113 After Bemba conveyed the inquiry’s result to FIDH, understandably, its president turned
the largely ignored FIDH findings over to the ICC.
114 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 602 n.1877.
115 The “Bomengo case” came out of the Mondonga inquiry and refers to the proceedings
against Lieutenant Willy Bomengo and other soldiers of the 28th Battalion arrested in Bangui
on October 30, 2002, on charges of pillaging. Id. ¶ 586. See also id. ¶ 298.
116 Id. ¶ 712.
117 Id. ¶ 720.
118 Given the concurring opinion’s emphasis that responsibility might not lie with the highest
level of command, but instead with line commanders, the absence of an investigation or inquiry
of the actions of the latter is a glaring omission. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08,
Appeals Chamber Judgement Separate Opinion of Judge Wyngaert and Judge Morrison, ¶¶
33–35 (June 8, 2018). If geographically—or higher—positioned commanders have effective
control over these intermediate commanders or even unit commanders, then surely Bemba, as
the higher-positioned commander, should have conducted a competent review of the means
by which his subordinates carried out their Article 28 duties.
119 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 589, 720, 722.
120 Id.
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majority’s focus on the number of crimes, to the exclusion of the nature of those
crimes, as the relevant means by which to assess the measures Bemba took to prevent
or repress crimes was particularly troubling, as war-crimes investigations, even
when adequate as to other crimes, have historically suffered from insufficiencies when
it comes to sexual-violence allegations.121 Given that none of the measures Bemba
took appear intended to prevent or punish these crimes, it is difficult to see how the
measures he took met the standard of “all necessary and reasonable measures within
his . . . power.”122
2. The Trial Chamber’s Error in Assessing Bemba’s Measures Based on
Shortcomings in Their Execution
A second error highlighted by the majority of the Appeals Chamber was that the
Trial Chamber erred in assessing Bemba’s measures based on shortcomings in their
execution.123 The Trial Chamber had found the measures Bemba took to be inade-
quate, in part because they were “limited in mandate, execution, and/or results.”124 The
Appeals Chamber majority found that “the measures taken by a commander cannot
be faulted merely because of shortfalls in their execution.”125 Rather, when assessing
whether the shortfalls of measures taken by a commander should be taken into ac-
count in determining their sufficiency, a court must establish, “(i) that the shortcomings
of the inquiry were sufficiently serious; (ii) that the commander was aware of the
shortcomings; (iii) that it was materially possible to correct the shortcomings; and
(iv) that the shortcomings fell within his or her authority to remedy.”126 The majority
found that the Trial Chamber failed to use these factors,127 adding that absent such
an analysis, the failure of the measures’ “mandate, execution, and/or results” could
not be attributed to Bemba unless the Trial Chamber found that “Bemba purposively
limited the mandates of the commissions and inquiries” to investigate crimes.128
This finding is curious for a couple of reasons. Earlier in its decision, the majority
found that the Trial Chamber inappropriately considered Bemba’s motives—in par-
ticular, his desire to rehabilitate the public image of the MLC—when determining
that the measures he took were inadequate.129 However, here, the majority appeared
121 See Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes
Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 65, 66 (1999); Steains, supra
note 14, at 364–65, 375–83.
122 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(a)(b).
123 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 180–81.
124 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 720.
125 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 180.
126 Id.
127 Id. ¶¶ 180–81.
128 Id. ¶ 181.
129 Id. ¶¶ 176–77, 179 (finding that Bemba’s motivation for rehabilitating the public image
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to indicate that the Trial Chamber should not have attributed the shortcomings of
those measures to Bemba without assessing whether he purposely limited the
measures he took in response to allegations that his troops committed crimes.130 As
an initial matter, Bemba’s motives would seem highly relevant to an understanding
of whether he purposely limited the measures he took. Indeed, absent an express
admission to this by Bemba—which of course would be highly unlikely—evidence
that Bemba was motived by something other than a genuine desire to prevent or
repress crimes would be quite pertinent to whether the specific measures he adopted
were limited by design. Second, the majority cited no authority for the test it set out
for a court to attribute to the accused the limitations of the results of the measures
he undertook. Adding requirements not supported by the text of the Rome Statute
(or other sources) unnecessarily restricts the interpretation of theories of liability that
can be used to hold an accused criminally liable, which in turn negatively affects the
prospects for accountability for SVGB crimes, as was the case here.131
3. The Trial Chamber’s Failure to Appreciate Fully the Limitations Bemba Faced
in Investigating and Prosecuting Crimes as a Remote Commander
A third error highlighted by the majority was that the Trial Chamber failed to ap-
preciate fully “the limitations that [ ] Bemba would have faced in investigating and
prosecuting crimes as a remote commander sending troops to a foreign country.”132
Significantly, it noted that this error “had an important impact on the overall assess-
ment of measures taken by [ ] Bemba.”133
of the MLC troops did not necessarily conflict with the taking of genuine and effective measures
as “it is conceivable that a commander may discharge his duty to take ‘necessary and reasonable
measures’ and in doing so accomplish multiple, additional or extraneous purposes, such as
protecting the public image of his forces”).
130 Id. ¶¶ 176–77.
131 SáCouto, Sadat & Sellers, supra note 8.
132 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 191. See also id. ¶¶ 171–73. It is worth noting
that in his separate opinion, President Eboe-Osuji clarifies:
[He does not] subscribe to any interpretation of the Majority Opinion as
suggesting that the geographic remoteness of a commander is a factor all
of its own, which would necessarily insulate him from criminal responsi-
bility. Geographic remoteness is only a factor to be considered among
other circumstances or peculiarities of a given case.
Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji,
¶ 258 (June 14, 2018). Nevertheless, President Eboe-Osuji finds that the concept of remoteness
is relevant and, in fact, “serves its greatest value in the assessment of what is reasonable as
a measure to prevent or repress violations [or] to submit them to competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.” Id.
133 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 191.
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This finding, too, is problematic for several reasons. As the previous section on the
roots of command responsibility indicates, command responsibility has historically
been used to hold commanders criminally liable for the crimes committed by their
subordinates, even when the commander is physically distant from the scene of the
crimes.134 As the dissent pointed out, this finding appears to be based on a select and
limited review of the record.135 After hearing and considering all the evidence, the
Trial Chamber found that while geographically remote from Bemba, MLC forces
had not been re-subordinated to the CAR’s military hierarchy, but rather remained
under the effective control of Bemba since their original deployment.136 Neverthe-
less, the majority found that the Trial Chamber failed to address the testimony of
one witness, P36, who suggested that “MLC’s investigative efforts were dependent
on the Central African authorities,” and that, therefore, Bemba’s power to investigate
crimes committed in the CAR was limited.137 Again, as the dissent pointed out, the
majority’s reliance on such a limited part of the record to reach this conclusion was
“troubling, particularly in circumstances where the Trial Chamber found P36 to be
a witness whose evidence should be analysed with ‘particular caution[,]’ a finding
which the Majority chose to ignore.”138 Finally, and most importantly, questions about
what additional measures Bemba could have taken in the CAR have little to do with
the fact that the measures he actually took were, as we discuss previously, inadequate
to respond to the crimes of sexual violence that were found to have been established
beyond a reasonable doubt.139 Indeed, given that none of the measures Bemba ac-
tually took focused on adequately investigating those crimes, it is clear that he fell
considerably short of taking “all necessary and reasonable measures within his . . .
power” to prevent or repress those crimes.140
CONCLUSION
The majority decision fell short in its examination of the facts of sexual violence
and the importance of such evidence in assessing Bemba’s criminal liability as a
134 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text (discussing the Hostage Case, in which
high-ranking German officers were charged with criminal responsibility under the doctrine
of command responsibility for the murder, deportation, and looting of thousands of civilians
from Nazi-occupied Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Albania by troops under their com-
mand). See also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the Tokyo Tribunal judgment,
which found General Matsui, who was present in Nanking only after the initial invasion, re-
sponsible for subordinates’ crimes prior to his arrival there because he “knew what was hap-
pening” and “did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors”).
135 Bemba Appeals Dissenting Opinion, supra note 83, ¶¶ 54–64.
136 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 698–700.
137 Bemba Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 172.
138 Bemba Appeals Dissenting Opinion, supra note 83, ¶ 63 (noting that the Trial Chamber
had found P36 “at times, evasive or contradictory”).
139 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 589, 720, 722.
140 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(a)–(b).
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commander under Article 28. The failure to assess the measures Bemba took with
respect to the sexual violence allegations should have raised significant doubts about
whether Bemba complied with his duties as a commander. The majority’s failure to
do this reflects an absence of the kind of insight that a critical gender-competent (or
feminist international law) analysis of command responsibility would have offered.
Granted, the majority recognized that Bemba’s liability, if established, would have
been overwhelmingly in regard to the crime of rape. However, it refrained from prop-
erly interrogating and contextualizing the evidence of those specific rapes and other
evidence of sexual violence.141 In fact, the sexual violence allegations were virtually
ignored when constructing the mandates of the inquiries, and questions that would
have flowed from a commission clearly mandated to investigate such crimes were
never asked. For instance, although responsibility can lie at various levels of com-
mand, no questions were asked about whether line commanders were informed of the
FIDH report or whether they fulfilled their duties to exercise command responsibil-
ity by reporting misconduct such as rape up the chain of command. Indeed, Bemba’s
actions with respect to his line commanders were never thoroughly contemplated by
the majority or concurring opinions. Nowhere does there exist an evidentiary review
of Bemba vetting subordinates concerning the efficiency of the means that they de-
ployed to competently prevent, punish, redress or report allegations of rape.
What could be the way forward? An appeals decision, even when the bench is
split three ways, is a formidable statement of the law and facts, not departed from
lightly. Jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals makes clear that, subsequent to an
appellate decision, trial chambers are generally bound to adhere to that decision.142
This practice acts as a due process safeguard, providing assurances of certainty,
predictability, as well as coherence or harmonization of the law.143 Whether an
appeals chamber can depart from previous appeals decisions is generally answered
in the negative in support of the identical values of legal certainty, predictability, and
consistency.144 Nonetheless, gradual, and even abrupt departure from previous hold-
ings are conceivable where “cogent reasons in the interest of justice” so require.145
As the Aleksovski appeals judgment elaborated:
141 See, e.g., M. Jarvis, Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Crimes: How Far We
Have Progressed and Where Do We Go From Here: Some Thoughts Based on ICTY Experience,
in IMAGINING LAW: ESSAYS IN CONVERSATION WITH JUDITH GARDAM 121 (D. Stephens & P.
Babie eds., 2016) (noting that in Prosecutor v. Stakic, for instance, the focus of the ICTY re-
garding sexual violence allegations was not on scale or patterns, but on context, in particular the
objective of the JCE members and the role sexual violence played in achieving that objective).
142 Prosecutor v. Zlato Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 113 (Mar. 24, 2000).
143 Id.
144 Id. ¶ 107.
145 Id.
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Instances of situations where cogent reasons in the interest of
justice require a departure from a previous decision include
cases where the previous decision has been decided on the basis
of the wrong legal principle or cases where a previous decision
has been given per incuriam, that is a judicial decision that has
been wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were
ill-informed about the applicable law.146
In light of the new standard of review used by the Appeals Chamber in Bemba,
critiqued at length by other commentators,147 and the majority’s clear failure to analyze
sexual violence evidence through a gender-competent lens, we believe future appeals
chambers faced with adjudicating questions of command responsibility can and should
depart from the reasoning and evidentiary interpretation of the Bemba majority. Often,
rape is not explicitly planned or orchestrated from the outset of a conflict. Yet once it
occurs and it becomes clear that superiors do not disapprove of it, rape often becomes
more frequent and more violent and contributes to the broader violent acts committed
against the targeted group. Command responsibility is one of the few ways courts
can hold commanders accountable who can—but clearly fail in their duty to—put
a stop to this violence. The Rome Statute’s call for justice and particular emphasis on
provisions designed to ensure that sexual violence crimes are adequately investigated
and prosecuted demands that future appeals chambers revisit this decision using the
kind of analysis that a critical gender-competent lens would offer.
146 Id. ¶ 108.
147 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
